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May 20091. Introduction
Until very recently, economic development in Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries
2 has been seen by most analysts in both academic and pol-
icy circles as a largely positive if not a very positive story. For example, at
the end of 2005, Business Week ran a cover story titled “Central Europe –
Rise of a Powerhouse”. It has become commonplace to argue that the suc-
cess of CEE development is mainly due to neoliberal economic policies (lib-
eralized markets, balanced public budget, price stability, low tax burden,
and strongly market oriented reforms in all socio-economic sectors) pursued
by these countries since the early 1990s. In other words, CEE countries
have been poster countries for Washington Consensus policies. Indeed, as
we show below, during the entire decade of the1990s, industrial restruc-
turing and embryonic innovation policies in CEE were largely dominated by
Washington Consensus thinking. We aim to show that, first, these policies
have been a double-edged sword: on the one hand enabling fast and furi-
ous industrial restructuring while, on the other hand, locking CEE economies
into economic activities with low value added/productivity growth and thus
undermining future sustainable growth. However, the impact of accession
into the European Union (EU) has been equally pivotal for industrial restruc-
turing and innovation policy making in CEE countries in the 2000s and this
process can be summed up as a strong Europeanization of innovation poli-
cy in CEE. We aim to show, second, that also Europeanization has been
largely a double-edged sword for CEE countries. Since joining the EU in
2004 or 2007, and already during the accession process, there is a strong
change in innovation policies in many CEE countries towards a much more
active role of the state. In this change there is a clear and strong role of
EU’s structural funding, particularly the negotiations and planning that
comes with it. However, these changes come with specific problems: first,
there is an over-emphasis in emerging CEE innovation policies on a linear
understanding of innovation (from lab to market) that is based on the
assumption that there is a growing demand from industry for R&D (which
is not the case because of the structural changes that took place in the
1990s via the Washington Consensus policies); and, second, increasing
usage of independent implementation agencies in an already weak admin-
istrative capacity environment lacking policy skills for networking and long-
term planning. We argue that such Europeanization of innovation policy in
CEE, while highly positive in directing CEE to reorient economic and inno-
vation policies towards more sustainable growth, is in its implementation
often only deepening and exasperating the existing problems of networking
2
2 In the context of this article, Central and Eastern European countries are the following ten most
recent member states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.and coordination. However, both Washington Consensus policies and the
process of Europeanization created fertile ground for significant financial
fragility to develop in CEE countries during the second half of the 2000s
which contributed to the financial woes these countries experience in the
current global recession. Underlying both Washington Consensus policies
and the impact of the EU on CEE is the assumption that the best intellec-
tual and policy framework to integrate CEE countries into the world econo-
my and secure sustainable growth is a Ricardian comparative advantage
framework that assumes that all economic integration are more or less sym-
metrical and integrative. We show that this is deeply misleading and that
this misunderstanding led to deep-rooted cognitive dissonance between
policies employed for industrial restructuring and innovation in CEE and
actual developments taking place in the private sectors of these countries.
This cognitive dissonance is also one of the key reasons why financial
fragility was not recognized early enough to counteract it.
2. Methodological note
Following a broadly Neo-Schumpeterian approach, we assume that compa-
nies innovate in order to hedge their balance sheets; that is, companies
innovate in order to generate revenues and outcompete their competitors,
and they do so in a number of ways, e.g. by developing new or improved
products, services or by introducing organizational or marketing changes,
etc. (See also OECD and Eurostat 2005). In trying to hedge their balance
sheets through innovations companies rely on skills and routines they have
developed, or as Alfred Chandler called this, companies rely on “learned
organizational capabilities” that include technical know-how, management
and marketing skill, established networks etc. (Chandler 2005; also Nelson
and Winter 1982). These capabilities, however, develop and evolve in a
wider context that can be called a national system of innovation that can
have a huge variety of features from the legal system to particularities of
education and R&D. (See in particular Freeman 1974 and 1987)
We use innovation policies to denote a set of public sector efforts that aims
to enable private sector upgrading in terms of technology and skills, but also
in terms of a wider set of activities, such as organizational change and
capabilities. In other words, innovation policies aim at changing and upgrad-
ing patterns and features of private sector learned organizational capa-
bilities.
In what follows, we try to track the evolution of main features of CEE com-
pany-level organizational capabilities and of national innovation systems
since the 1990s. These concepts serve as rough approximations and
heuristic devices to organize actual historical events. We do so largely by
3using stylized facts, and we are fully aware that such an approach abstracts
diverse actual developments. (See also footnote 14 below) However, we
hope to show that – particularly in comparison with East Asian develop-
ment – CEE countries followed a similar path since 1990 and look surpris-
ingly alike.  
The following is divided into 4 parts: in the first three sections we depict
the stylized facts of industrial upgrading, changes in the R&D system, and
corresponding innovation policies in CEE since 1990. The final part of the
essay summarizes the previous sections and draws conclusions about evo-
lution of the main features of organizational capabilities and national sys-
tems of innovations in CEE since 1990.
3. Stylized facts of CEE industrial restructuring in 1990s
Perhaps the key assumption behind how Central and Eastern European
countries should go about reforming their economies in the late 1980s and
early 1990s was the belief that, as Martin Wolf argues, “new opportunities
were at last opening up for developing countries to export manufactures
and a range of relatively sophisticated services competitively” (Wolf 2007).
Indeed, it can be argued that economists of almost all persuasions seemed
to share one common view: globalization in the form of global financial mar-
kets and trade liberalization would greatly benefit CEE countries.
Globalization was seen as the main factor in delivering fast economic
restructuring spurred by global capital in form of foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows. This enthusiasm was largely based on the classical Ricardian
assumption of comparative advantage defined, in a classic textbook for-
mulation, as follows: “trade between two countries can benefit both coun-
tries if each country exports the goods in which it has a comparative advan-
tage.” (Krugman and Obstfeld 2005:26) Krugman’s work in the 1990s that
included economies of scale into the Ricardian framework, assumed that
the mutually beneficial trade takes place between countries possessing
increasing returns activities. (See Krugman and Obstfeld 2005:110-146;
and Krugman 1996) Thus, as CEE countries exhibited high levels of indus-
trialization at the end of the 1980s (comparable to East Asia), it seemed
correct to assume that globalization would indeed greatly help these
economies to restructure the industry and to become vastly more efficient
in production through trade and increased competition. (See also Radosevic
1998 and Guerrieri 1998 for discussion). 
However, the augmented Ricardian framework failed to take into account
two phenomena: first, the 1990s saw the onslaught of what has been
termed a new techno-economic paradigm that completely changed the
nature of industrialization and essentially stripped many maturing and
4increasingly foot-loose industrial activities of significant (dynamic) scale
economies; second, the Ricardian framework assumes that all economic
integrations are alike (integration works always through comparative advan-
tages) and provides the same economic strategy in all contexts and at dif-
ferent points in time (‘one size fits all’). We shall attempt to show, howev-
er, that qualitatively differing forms of economic integrations exist, some of
them highly successful and some of them exactly the opposite. This phe-
nomenon could potentially have enormous impact on how developing coun-
tries integrate into the world economy. Thus, before we discuss innovation
policy in CEE since 1990, we need to very briefly explain the general impact
of the new techno-economic paradigm in order to understand how CEE
economies were integrated into the global economy. The latter process, in
turn, is crucial for innovation policy developments during the entire period
under discussion.
Carlota Perez, the author of the concept, has briefly summarized the idea
of techno-economic paradigms as follows:
There has been a technological revolution every 40 to 60 years, 
beginning with the Industrial Revolution in England at the end of
the 18
th Century; each has generated a great surge of develop-
ment, diffusing unevenly across the world from an initial core
country. … The great wealth creating potential provided by each
of them stems from the combination of the new technologies,
industries and infrastructures with a set of generic technologies 
and organisational principles capable of modernizing the rest of the
economy. The resulting best practice frontier is superior to the
previous one and becomes the new common sense for efficiency
–a new techno-economic paradigm– that defines the guidelines for 
innovation and competitiveness. … The propagation is highly
uneven in coverage and timing, by sectors and by regions, in each
country and across the world. (Perez 2006; see also Perez 2002)
The paradigms describe how technological change and innovation of a
given period are most likely to take place: organizational forms and finance
that are conducive to innovations, what technological capabilities and skills
are needed etc. Accordingly, the new ICT-based techno-economic para-
digm, coming to full force in the 1990s, has engendered key changes in
production processes in almost all industries (including many services and
agriculture): outsourcing and the resulting geographical dispersion of pro-
duction functions. This is based on significantly enhanced technological and
organizational capabilities in introducing “modularity” into production
processes and networks (Berger 2006). These changes have enabled very
fast growth in FDI inflows into developing countries as well as industrial-
ization (e.g., in terms of growth rates of manufactured and high-tech
exports), at least on the surface, in many developing countries.
5Consequently, particularly in the late 1990s it seemed as if the Ricardian
gamble was paying off for CEE: technology-intensive exports were grow-
ing, and catching-up seemed relatively likely (see for empirical data and dis-
cussion, e.g., Landesmann 2000; Hotopp, Radosevic and Bishop 2005).
However, in many cases the outsourcing activities do not exhibit the same
dynamics that used to be associated with them in the originating countries:
fast and sustained productivity growth, raising real wages, forward and
backward linkages, but rather the opposite. (See for detailed discussion and
data, e.g., Palma 2005, Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, Tiits et al 2008) The
underlying cause why so many policy analysts and economists missed what
is going on in these activities is hidden in the very nature of modularity in
production. What is statistically captured as a high technology product may
in reality be very different in nature: it can be touch screens for iPhones or
it can be assembled mobile phones for any brand mobile producer. Both
show up as high technology statistics, yet the former is a product at the
beginning of its life cycle and the latter has clearly reached maturity. Indeed,
when iPhone was introduced in 2007, Balda AG was the only company in
the world able to produce the high number of innovative touch displays
used by Apple in iPhones (Business Week 2007). This is manifestly not the
case in mobile phone assembly as such. Thus, the key assumption of com-
parative advantage trade models and theories fell away: even if high tech-
nology exports have been growing in developing countries, this does not
mean that we deal with similarly dynamic sectors with significant increas-
ing returns (See also Krugman 2008a). Due to changing techno-economic
paradigm, integrating CEE (and other developing countries) has become in
many ways an increasingly asymmetrical matter. In fact, the CEE countries
seem to have specialized in activities that exhibit the ‘low quality’ charac-
teristics in a dynamic Quality Index of Economic Activities in Figure 1. 
6Figure 1. The Quality Index of Economic Activities
Source: Reinert 2007.
7Yet, from 1990 up to today policy environment for industrial restructuring
and innovation in CEE assumes the opposite: CEE integration is based on
symmetrical integration. Partially this was so because of the assumptions
implicit in the Ricardian model, partially the actual statistics looked mis-
leading (high technology bias) and most actors involved were engaged in
reasonably high levels of wishful thinking. In fact it may be argued that
Europe’s relation to its own periphery shows very similar characteristics of
asymmetry that the world economy as a whole does to the global periph-
ery (Reinert 2006). This may mean a tendency towards factor-price polar-
ization rather than factor-prize equalization.   
It can be argued that much of the pre-Smithian history of economic thought
is filled with treatises trying to understand why certain types of trade with
certain regions bring beneficial results and other types do not, i.e. being
concerned with the dangers of asymmetrical integration. The clearest early
statement of this theory is found in the first pages of Charles King’s three-
volume work (1721), a compilation of works published in the previous
decade, which was to enjoy unique authority for decades. It is important to
note that his theory is based on a possible discrepancy between the inter-
est of the merchant and the interest of the nation itself: “There are gener-
al Maxims in Trade which are assented to by every body. That a Trade may
be of Benefit to the Merchant and Injurious to the Body of the Nation, is
one of these Maxims.” (1721:1) This is, of course, very different from the
later teachings of Adam Smith, who assumes an automatic harmony of
interests between merchant and nation. In King’s scheme, the normal pre-
Smithian scheme, the vested interests of some economic actors will coin-
cide with those of the nation-state – mainly those of the manufacturers –
while the vested interests of other economic actors will be at odds with the
interests of the nation-state. 
The pre-Smithian taxonomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trade was based on the
observation of the obvious urban bias of economic development that was
found everywhere in Europe. The taxonomy is based on the fundamental
understanding that economic development is activity-specific, at any point
in time available in some economic activities rather than in others.
Development was seen as a goal created by increasing returns and innova-
tions in manufacturing and not in agriculture, where stagnant productivity,
diminishing returns and monoculture, and absence of synergies prevented
growth (see as examples Botero 1590, Serra 1613 & 2009, and Reinert
2007 for in-depth discussions).  
As a continuation of King’s principles, and with the experience of 300 more
years of economic history, we can establish the taxonomy – based on ‘ideal
types’ – of economic integrations (see Figure 2). There are two main types:
symmetrical free trade areas (i.e., integration among nations at a similar
8level of economic development and economic sophistication), and asym-
metrical free trade areas (i.e., integration of nations with widely different
economic structure at different levels of development). 
Figure 2: Taxonomy of Economic Integrations
Source: Reinert and Kattel 2007, modified.
There are two further, essentially mixed types of integration: First, the wel-
fare colonialism type of integration. The term “welfare colonialism” was
coined by anthropologist Robert Paine, who described the economic inte-
gration of the Arctic population into Canada (1977: esp. 1-52), and may
partly well be applied to the integration of the Saami people in Norway. The
essential features of welfare colonialism are: 1) the classical colonial drain
is reversed, the net flow of funds is to the colony rather than to the moth-
er country; and 2) the native population is integrated in a way that destroys
their previous livelihood, and they are put on the dole. Second, there can
also be an integrative and asymmetrical type of economic integration. This
is a type of economic integration that differs from the classical colonial ver-
9sion above in that it attempts to integrate the asymmetrical partners –
countries at different levels of economic development – into a welfare
state. If we look at the way CEE countries have been integrating into the
European Union, it can be argued that this process is largely falling under
this heading in terms of economic integration. We base this judgement on
three fundamental stylized facts that can be observed in CEE development
since the 1990s:
3
First, while CEE and other key developing countries experienced an exhilarat-
ing rise in FDI and exports, there is a stunningly obvious divergence in income
growth between Asian economies, on the one hand, and CEE economies on
the other hand (Figures 3 and 4). While China and Korea have seen their GDP
per capita multiplied at least 4 times since 1980, CEE economies have strug-
gled throughout the last decades to stay above the 1980 level.
4
Figure 3: GDP per person employed, index (1980 = 100), 1980-2006.
5
Source: World Bank WDI Online database.
10
3 For more detailed arguments, see Reinert and Kattel 2007, and Tiits et al 2008.
4 According to the World Bank’s calculations, the recession many former Soviet republics experi-
enced during the 1990s, and are still experiencing, is worse than the Great Depression in the USA
and the World War II in Western Europe (both recovered considerably quicker). In fact, for example,
“even if Ukraine managed to grow steadily at 5 percent a year, starting in 2002, it would take until
2017 to regain its previous peak – implying a transformational recession of more than a quarter of
a century at best.” (World Bank 2005) Of course, the financial meltdown that reached many CEE
countries starting in 2008 will certainly significantly prolong the process of catching-up.






































































RomaniaAs Guerrieri argued already in 1998, the East Asian economies “have sur-
passed Eastern Europe in many industries, not only in traditional product
groups, but also in more technologically sophisticated sectors” and this is
particularly so in “R&D-intensive (science based) sectors”. (1998:20) While
CEE countries’ share in world trade grew from 0.73% in 1980 to 0.95% in
1995, East Asia’s share grew in the same period from 3.80% to 10.83%.
(Guerrieri 1998:29)
6 This trend is particularly pronounced for science based
industries: CEE grew from 0.29% to 0.39% in the period from 1980 to
1995, East Asian economies grew from 4.83% to staggering 17.82%.
(1998:38)
Figure 4. Income and productivity levels relative to the United States: GDP per capita,
1973-2006.
Source: OECD databases.
Particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, most CEE and other former
Soviet economies saw deep dives in their growth rates and in industry as
well as service sector value added. It took more than a decade for most CEE
countries to reach the growth and development levels of 1990; many, how-
ever, still severely lag behind their development levels of 1990.
7 (Tiits et al
2008)
11
6  Guerrieri counts under CEE Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics; under East Asia
Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
7 For instance, countries like the Ukraine, Moldova, and most central Asian countries fell from mid-
dle income economies to poor countries and by now represent failed or fragile economies; see fur-
ther Reinert, Amaïzo and Kattel 2009.The main reason behind such a deep dive was, second, rapid deindustrial-
ization and primitivization of industrial enterprises (Reinert 2007, Chapter 5)
or even the outright destruction of many previously well-known and suc-
cessful companies (see also Mencinger 2007; Landesmann 2000; Rodrik
1992). This happened because of the way Soviet industrial companies, and
the industry in general, were built up and ran in a complex cluster-like web
of planning and competition.
8 (On corresponding Soviet R&D system, see
below in the next section). A sudden opening of the markets and abolition
of capital controls made these industrial companies extremely vulnerable.
The partially extreme vertical integration that was the norm in such com-
panies meant that if one part of the value chain ran into problems due to
the rapid liberalization, it easily brought down the entire chain. However,
foreign companies seeking to privatize plants were almost always interest-
ed in only part of the value-chain (a specific production plant, infrastructure
or location) and thus privatization turned into publicly led attrition of com-
panies and jobs.
9 Liberalization of markets and prices meant that for many
domestic companies demand was cut down, and thus companies with the
highest relative fixed costs to variable costs (these tend also to be the tech-
nologically most advanced ones) were hit the hardest as their balance
sheets worsened very quickly. If a company had a lot of machinery and
equipment to be amortized, i.e. there have been recent investments into
upgrading, then it is particularly harshly hit if its demand drops and if it is
under financial stress because of liabilities to newly founded banks. Thus,
by definition, the most advanced industries were hit by rapid liberalization
first and also the hardest.
10 The last sector to survive is subsistence agri-
culture. This is called the Vanek-Reinert effect
11 and it could be observed
in the unification of Italy in the 19
th century, in Latin America in the 1980s,
and again in the 1990s in CEE and other post-Soviet countries. One under-
lying cause was the particular nature of industrialization of CEE economies.
In the last instance this process creates outward migration. The sequence
may be described as de-industrialization, de-agriculturization, de-population.  
Third, such a drastic change made it relatively easy to actually replace
Soviet industry: with the macroeconomic stability and liberalization of mar-
kets, followed by a rapid drop in wages, many former Soviet economies
12
8 Radosevic 1999 is a good overview, see esp. 287-289; also Chandler 1993. For studies of Soviet
industry, see Berliner 1976, Bergson 1978, and case studies like that of Skoda by Margolius and
Meisl  1992, of East Germany’s industry by Stokes 2000, and of Czech industry by Kosta 2005.
For case studies on company level transition to capitalism, see Radosevic and Yoruk 2001.
9 Frost and Weinstein 1998, and Young 1994 offer excellent examples of how Western companies
such as ABB, Gerber and others privatized CEE companies.
10 For instance, Radosevic shows how in higher-end computers, “where domestic demand is not
growing and where finance requirements are high, the ex-socialist producers have closed down in
all CEEC.” (1999:299, also 303)
11 First articulated in Reinert 1980.became increasingly attractive as privatization targets and outsourcing of
production (we will return to policies in the next section). Indeed, one of the
most fundamental characteristics of CEE industry (and services) since 1990
has been that the majority of companies have actually engaged in process
innovation (e.g. in the form of acquisition of new machinery) in seeking to
become more and more cost-effective in the new market place. 
In sum, the key to understand why CEE seem to stand still or even fall
behind when compared to Asian economies such as South Korea is the way
many industrial companies were integrated into the world economy in the
1990s. CEE strongly embraced the idea of FDI-led restructuring which
worked, however, in a highly specific way because of the simultaneous
change in the techno-economic paradigm, and brought specialization at the
lower end of the Quality Index and the value chain with grave difficulties of
upgrading and, most importantly, strong enclavization, de-linkaging and
primitivizing tendencies. The key why FDI-led strategies worked in such a
way lies in a historic coincidence of techno-economic paradigm change and
the onslaught of Washington Consensus policies taking place more or less
at the same time. CEE countries were essentially flooded with FDI that was
seeking to set up activities without significant increasing returns and this
turned the integration of CEE into European and global markets into an
asymmetrical but integrative type of integration. However, crucially, as we
will show in the rest of the essay, the specific nature of CEE integration
plays virtually no role in CEE innovation policies during the entire period
from 1990 until today. Or to put it differently, the nature of CEE integration
into global markets was mistaken to be a symmetrical and integrative type
and the innovation policies followed from this assumption.
4. Disintegration of the Soviet R&D system in transition
However, in order to fully appreciate the changes in policy and their impact
on innovation and economic development in general, we shall give a very
brief overview of Soviet science and technology, and research and devel-
opment system, and how these were initially influenced by the transition
process.
Perversely mirroring the above-described cluster-like characteristic of Soviet
industrial activities, the R&D system was based on similar vertical integra-
tion of R&D into specialized institutions: “Under socialism, most technical
change was pushed from one institutional sector … which was essentially
a grouping of R&D institutes and other related activities … This sector
involved in activities far beyond R&D including design, engineering and
often trouble-shooting activities.” (Radosevic 1999: 282) These institutions
were usually also the originators and carriers of patents and forms of intel-
1314
lectual property rights. (Ibid.: 285) This means that the Soviet-style R&D
system had very low level of company in house R&D. (Radosevic 1998: 80-
81) Industrial conglomerates were effectively cut off from various potential
learning and feedback loops; production and actual innovation (in particular
in the form of new products and processes) took place in different institu-
tions, both however highly concentrated and integrated. Thus, in general
the system was highly linear and supply-based.
The R&D institutes concentrated often on ‘grey’ literature (manuals and the
like) and overwhelmingly on mechanical engineering, which means that
mostly these R&D capacities had little if any experience with competitive
environment and imperfect competition prevalent in technologically and
innovation-driven markets. These characteristics together with the Vanek-
Reinert effect led in transition to “the fast marginalization of once hyper-
developed R&D; the collapse of industrial demand for R&D; changes in
industry demand for R&D; polarization of the R&D spectrum; and a chang-
ing institutional landscape.” (Radosevic 1998: 84) 
Indeed, the once complex tasks of engineering, designing and similar tasks
were very rapidly replaced by significantly simpler commodified support
activities as many companies were wiped out, privatized or restructured.
The former R&D institutes could have played a key role in bridging academic
research with industry needs as they were essentially the only existing link
between the two. With the collapse of the institutes system, the link
between academy and industry became, as Radosevic suspected in 1998,
the weakest link in the CEE R&D system. (1998: 90) Indeed, in “conditions
of high uncertainty and prolonged privatization, the intangible assets and
know-how of industrial institutes, primarily embodied in R&D groups, prob-
ably erode much faster than production skills in industry.” (1998: 100)
Massive onslaught of FDI, in particular since the second half of the 1990s
and privatization of enterprises gave foreign enterprises a key role in indus-
trial restructuring and innovation. This, in turn, only reinforced the severing
of linkages between former R&D institutes and the enterprise sector. (See
also Radosevic 1999: 297).
This change can be seen in all basic S&T and R&D data. The rapid decline
in R&D employment after 1990 took on partially enormous proportions with
employment dropping by a third or more in CEE as shown in Figure 5.
(Radosevic 1998: 86; also Meske 1998)Figure 5. R&D personnel in CEE countries, 1980-1997; 1980=100.
12
Source: Meske 1998. 
In particular when compared to East Asia’s developments over the same
period, CEE transition in the 1990s is in many ways a lost decade in terms
of basic R&D indicators. In Figures 6-8, South Korea is used as a proxy for
East Asian countries and Mexico for Latin America. The Figures show that
CEE countries converge with Latin American trends and not with East Asian
ones.
15
12 Meske 1998 brings similar figures with similar tendencies also for the Baltic states, Russia and
other former Soviet republics.Figure 6. General Expenditure on Research and Development as % of GDP, 1990-2006.
Source: SourceOCED database.
The decrease in GERD from 1990 onwards until the end of the decade coin-
cides, as we will show below, with big divides in CEE innovation policies.
With the beginning of the accession negotiations and increasing funding
from the EU, CEE countries’ investments into R&D start to increase while
the preceding decades mirror the ideas of Washington Consensus policies
that market initiaties (also in form of R&D investments) are more important
and efficient than public sector intervention.
Figures 7 and 8 indicate very similar tendencies in patent applications and
scientific publicatons in CEE compared to East Asia and Latin America.
While CEE and Latin America are more or less flatlining since 1990 or 1985
respectively, South Korean development is qualitatively highly different.
16Figure 7. Patent application at European, US and Japanese patent offices, 1990-2005;
1990=100.
Source: SourceOCED database
Figure 8. Scientific and technical articles, 1985-2005; 1985=100.
Source: World Bank WDI Online database.
17Against this background the significance of rapid increase in high technolo-
gy exports also in CEE countries becomes clearer (Figure 8). In high tech-
nology exports CEE and Latin America are clearly following the same path
as East Asian economies.
Figure 9. High technology exports as % of all manufactured exports, 1988-2006.
Source: World Bank WDI Online database.
Yet, dissonance between disintegrating R&D system, much slower catch-
ing up pace and rapidly growing high tech exports are perhaps the best indi-
cator of how importantly the change in techno-economic paradigm and the
rise of modularity and outsourcing production changed the perception of
what is happening in CEE countries. As we will see in the next section,
innovation policy in CEE was a key driving factor in initiating changes in the
R&D system and also cementing the perception of high-tech based growth.
5. Innovation policy in CEE since 1990
If we look at the CEE innovation policy developments since 1990, we can
divide these into three rather distinct periods:
1) Killing the Geese, 1990-1998;
2) Harmonization with the EU 1998-2004;
3) Awakening, since 2004.
18Killing the Geese, 1990-1998
The flying geese metaphor (see above, Figure 2) for economic integrations
first appears in a 1935 article by Kaname Akamatsu published in Japanese.
His views became known to the West in his 1961 article in
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, and during the 1980s Japanese economist and
foreign minister Saburo Okita propagated the concept. The essence of the
flying geese pattern of economic integration is that nations upgrade and
catch up technologically by sequentially riding the same technological
wave. It essentially describes the way East Asian nations grew.
13
To illustrate the process, follow a product: a hairdryer is produced in Japan and
exported to the rest of the world. When Japan upgrades its technology and
wage level, the production of hairdryers passes on to Korea and is exported
from that country. As Korean production after a while also gets more sophis-
ticated, the production of simple hairdryers passes on to Taiwan, where the
phenomenon is again repeated. Hairdryer production moves on to Malaysia and
Thailand, and finally to Vietnam. On the way all nations have increased their
wealth and upgraded technologically, based on the same product.
We argue that CEE countries followed essentially the opposite strategy of
killing the geese: trying to restructure their economies, and in particular
industries, through a very rapid replacement (not gradual upgrading) of
Soviet style companies.
14 This pattern is extremely different from the very
successful integration of Spain into the EU starting in 1986: The strategy
towards Spain was based on a gradual reduction of tariffs aiming at assur-
ing the survival of the existing Spanish industrial sector, including the activ-
ities with a high score on the dynamic Quality Index of Economic Activities
(Figure 1). The EU integrated with Spain in a way that provided a
Schumpeterian creative destruction that upgraded the existing industrial sec-
tor. In contrast, the EU strategy towards the CEE countries – certainly part-
ly as a result of the market triumphalism following the fall of the Berlin Wall
– created a form of ‘destructive destruction’: the high value (‘high quality’)
sectors were destroyed and were replaced by low value added sectors. 
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13 The model builds on Friedrich List’s stages of integration. Its dynamics are similar to Michael
Porter’s stages of national development (Porter 1990) and to Ray Vernon’s life-cycle theory of inter-
national trade (Vernon 1966) and to Jane Jacobs’ import-replacing development of cities (Jacobs
1984).
14 It is clear that we are abstracting here from the actual policy developments in CEE. Drahokoupil
2007 offers a very interesting way to group different strategies followed by CEE countries in the
1990s: “The competition states in the Visegrád four can be called Porterian, aiming at attracting
strategic FDI through targeted subsidies … The Baltic competition states can be called macroeco-
nomic stability-driven neoliberal states with monetary institutions at their core. … Finally, Slovenia
has developed a distinct type of competition state, which can be characterized as balanced neo-cor-
poratist.” (2007: 90).The CEE story is similar to that experienced by Mexico in its integration with
its Northern neighbors in NAFTA (see Cimoli 2000). The ‘destructive cre-
ation’ in financial markets added an additional blow to the peripheral coun-
tries both in the EU and NAFTA. In both cases the adjusting factor is out-
ward migration: the comparative advantage of the periphery becomes the
export of its people.   
As we argued above, together with the change in the techno-economic par-
adigm, Washington Consensus policies (trade and capital account open-
ness, increasing reliance on foreign direct investments and exports to drive
growth, low inflation, balanced public budgets and generally rolled back
state) were the key behind the fast and furious restructuring of the
economies that CEE countries experienced in the 1990s. The Washington
Consensus policies were considered by many CEE countries as the innova-
tion and industrial policy measures and in essence there were no other pol-
icy initiatives.
15 During the 1990s innovation policy proper was considered
as secondary to transition related concerns (Mickiewicz & Radosevic 2001:
10). Indeed, innovation, R&D or generally science and technology policies
and funding schemes intact during this period were carry-overs from the
socialism times and were rapidly disintegrating, as we showed above. In
many ways this was a period of ‘no policy policy’. The demand from the
market was supposed to be the key driver of changes in R&D and innova-
tions – and their funding. Rather, CEE countries were enjoying productivity
growth mainly in the realm of “reallocations” that turned out be only of
highly temporary nature (Radosevic 2002a: 355; Radosevic 2006). This
also suggests, as we argue above, that innovation in CEE during the 1990s
is mainly about equipment and the mastery of production capabilities, and
is not related to R&D (Radosevic 2006: 37-38).
During this period, almost all economic policy capacity building was direct-
ed towards macro-economic skills (at central banks, ministries of finance,
also think tanks). This was greatly helped by the advice and assistance from
the Washington institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, but also from
OECD and the EU. Policy networking, coordination and cooperation were
almost completely ignored. As there were no innovation policies proper,
there was also essentially no institution building in this area.
Coupled with the change of techno-economic paradigm, Washington
Consensus policies emphasizing FDI-led growth have created for CEE a truly
toxic situation where initially liability destruction was strong and quick but
20
15 As Weissenbacher 2007 argues, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia had experiences of dealing with
IMF already during the 1980s, when they borrowed money from it and applied standard austerity
programs (2007: 71-71).followed by slow asset creation. Thus, “the failure of the Consensus reform
policies lies in the fact that they provided support for the ‘destruction’ of
inefficient domestic industry, but failed to provide support for the ‘creative’
phase of ‘creative destruction’ of a real transformation of the productive
structure through higher investment and technological innovation.” (Kregel
2008)
In sum, the Washington Consensus or the killing the geese period (up to late
the 1990s) left CEE countries with an almost completely changed economic
and industrial structure that is deeply different and much less skill- and tech-
nology intensive than the previous structure. This explains fast growth but
also the not- catching-up with the Asian economies in terms of productivi-
ty and income growth as the productivity growth in CEE in the 1990s goes
back to significantly decreased employment in industry (see Landesmann
2000). In addition, there was essentially no innovation or industrial policy
and policy making competencies and institutional development centred
around macro-economic realm, networking, coordination and cooperation
were almost completely ignored.
Harmonization with the European Union, 1998-2004
While EU’s importance for CEE countries economic policies was visible
already during the early 1990s, the change that increased EU’s impact con-
siderably was the beginning of accession talks with most CEE countries in
1998 and later. Indeed, Havlik et al. 2001 argue that the adoption of the
EU acquis communautaire has had a much stronger impact on the modern-
ization of CEE industry than the official (often rudimentary) innovation pol-
icy during the 1990s. The introduction of new regulation (usually with sig-
nificantly higher safety, health and other standards) meant that CEE indus-
try “was forced to choose whether to modernize their products and pro-
duction facilities rather drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with
bigger players with greater economies of scale, or to close down altogeth-
er”. (See Tiits et al 2008: 76-77) However, while harmonization with
European standards is a distinct driver of changes in the private sector and
also in legal infrastructure, it is also important to note that such harmo-
nization made outsourcing and relocation of production much easier. On the
one hand, the harmonization process was a continuation of restructuring
processes that started during the previous period and were even signifi-
cantly enforced. On the other hand, through so-called pre-structural fund-
ing and its management, many CEE countries started to develop first strate-
gic documents and policies related to innovation and R&D proper.
The EU played a considerable role in setting the criteria for accession into
the Union and actively participated in building up capacities to meet these
21criteria already since the early 1990s (Bruszt 2002: 121; also Bruszt and
McDermott 2008). This is expressed in particular by the EU financial aid
through the PHARE programme that became the key instrument of the har-
monization period and also the first wave of Europeanisation. PHARE was
launched in 1989 as EU’s financial instrument to assist the CEE countries
(initially only Hungary and Poland) in their political and economic transition
from a centralised communist system to a decentralised liberal democratic
system. In its initial phase, PHARE remained a project-based financial assis-
tance scheme: it paid for inputs, rather than for results in terms of effective
adoption and implementation of the Acquis (Martens 2001: 37; Grabbe
2006: 80-81).
As PHARE was reformed profoundly during 1990s, also the grasp of the EU
became stronger: 1) PHARE was expanded to additional 11 countries eligi-
ble for support, and 2) PHARE’s goal as the EU’s main financial instrument
for support changed considerably: away from transition issues and eco-
nomic restructuring towards support of the accession process (Martens
2000; Martens 2001; Bailey & de Propris 2004). As a result, since 1998
(through the Accession Partnerships) PHARE can be considered as a legal
basis to secure transposition of the Acquis in deeper scale and scope
(Martens 2000: 5).
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In the late 1990s, due to the progressive decentralization of the PHARE
management structures as well as EU requirements for creation of regional
and local institutions to administer the EU funds after the accession, a sys-
tem of implementation agencies linked to the National Funds was created
and pursued in CEE (EC Regulation 1266/99; Commission Decision on the
Review of the PHARE Guidelines for the period 2000-2006; Grabbe 2006:
82). This marks the first step in CEE towards managing economic policy,
and thus innovation and industrial restructuring in a distinctly different
manner from the previous period where the free market and external forces
were seen as key drivers of change. However, it is also important to see
that these newly established agencies are mostly for managing external
funding, policy creation and respective capacity building play almost no role
in these agencies. Yet, this decentralization and in particular the existence
of autonomous state agencies have been seen as a positive feature in state-
market relationships due to multi-level accountability (Bruszt 2002), but
also due to the ability of this kind of policy-making system to reflect and
affect adequately the dynamic, global and technology-driven economy (e.g.
Goldsmith & Eggers 2004; for Central and Eastern European countries, see
22
16 In 2000, PHARE’s support was extended to economic and social cohesion and institutional capac-
ity building (preparation for management with structural funds) (PHARE Annual Report 2001).23
here Drechsler 2004). However, the compartmentalized and structured
nature of EU support (PHARE Consolidated Summary Report 2007) on the
one hand, and the lack of tradition of partnership and inter-institutional
coordination and cooperation between administrative levels on the other
hand, meant that most positive effects of such agencies were not reaped
and that they created in some cases more difficulties and problems than
they solved (ESPON 2005).
In addition, due to considerable time pressure – harmonizing the legal infra-
structure and preparing for accession in 6 years – meant that adoption of
EU’s legal infrastructure was done hastily and without much attention to
local context. (PHARE Consolidated Summary Report 2004; PHARE
Consolidated Summary Report 2007; see also Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier 2004; Goetz 2001). 
The need for implementation capacity was in particular relevant in the areas
where the Acquis was not specific and well defined and where implemen-
tation of Acquis needed complex and relatively well developed public
administration systems with a high degree of strategic policy development
capacities (PHARE Consolidated Summary Report 2004; PHARE
Consolidated Summary Report 2007; see also Martens 2001: 40 and
Martens 2000: Annexes). This was compounded by the fact that labor- and
resource intensive sectors forming most of the CEE industry were the ones
most affected by the Acquis (see Havlik et al. 2001; Havlik 2005: 123).
Thus, CEE industry went through another restructuing process that was
again led by external factors and again local context played little if any role
in policy considerations.
In sum, in many ways the harmonization with the EU rules is a period where
policies supported the restructuring of the industry that began in the 1990s
under the Washington Consensus policies; on the other hand, during this
period EU’s influence on funding and administrative schemes brought cre-
ation of novel governance structures that play up to today key part in inno-
vation policy in CEE.
However, if we look at what Radosevic calls “national innovation capaci-
ties”, then these were by 2000 clearly underdeveloped in all CEE countries
compared to the ‘old’ member states (Figure 10; Radosevic 2004).Figure 10. National Innovation Capacity (NIC) index for EU member states, 2000.
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Source: Based on Radosevic 2004.
Thus, the disintegration of the R&D system that began with the transition
was still in full force during the harmonization period. And while it can be
argued that by 2000, the CEE economies and in particular their innovation
capacities grouped these countries into two groups of stronger and weak-
er performers (Radosevic 2004: 660), most CEE economies start to recov-
er from the transition losses by 2000 (see Figures 3 and 4 above).
However, in particular with increasing flows of FDI into CEE and growing
high technology exports, the recovering was interpreted as imminent catch-
ing up or convergence with the ‘old’ Europe. This misconception became
the key driver of innovation policies in CEE from 2004 onwards.
Awakening, since 2004
While harmonization with the EU legal infrastructure was important both in
terms of the actual changes it brought to industry and in terms of policy imple-
mentation agencies that were created to manage EU’s financial help, the key
changes in innovation policy proper came with EU structural funding
18 that
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17 The index is built from 4 sub-indexes that are in turn based on the following data (in parenthe-
sis): Absorptive capacity (Expenditures in education in % of GDP; S&E graduates (% 20–29 popu-
lation); Population with 3rd level education; Participation in life-long learning; Employment medi-
um/high-tech manufacturing; Employment high-tech services); R&D supply (Public R&D expenditures
(% GDP); Business R&D expenditures (% GDP); R&D personnel per labour; EPO high-tech patents;
USPTO high-tech patens; Resident patents per capita); Diffusion (Training enterprises as % of all
enterprises; CVT in % of labour costs of all enterprises; ISO 9000 certifications per per capita;
Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants; PC per 100 inhabitants; ICT expenditures (% GDP); Demand
(Stock market capitalization in % GDP; Domestic credit provided by banking sector; Share of FDI in
GDP; Share of trade in GDP; Index of patent rights; Registered unemployment). (Radosevic 2004) 
18  For a general overview, see the EU’s official homepage for structural funding,
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm.started in 2004 and is set to continue at least until 2013. Indeed, as we will
see below, the EU structural funding significantly changed both the policy
content and implementation. However, as we will also see below, the key
problems that emerged during the harmonization period (low networking,
weak administrative capacity, coordination and cooperation problems) have
been in fact deepened during the current period.
The key content for many innovation policy initiatives in CEE emerging after
the accession was the underlying assumption that similarly to ‘old’
European countries, also the new members need to overcome the so-called
European paradox (good basic research, low commercialization of the
research results).
19 This is mostly due to miscued policy transfer from the
EU to the member states (See also INNO-Policy TrendChart Country
Reports 2006 and 2007). Accordingly, innovation and R&D policies emerg-
ing in CEE in the mid-2000s were based on a linear understanding of inno-
vation. Innovation is seen as something close to science and invention, and
that there is a more or less linear correspondence between scientific dis-
covery and high innovation performance; and that innovations behave like
Nokia’s mobile phones and thus search for the latter became the holy grail
of CEE innovation policy. Thus, CEE innovation policies emerging in early
and mid 2000s tend to concentrate on high technology sectors, on com-
mercializing university research, technology parks for start-ups and similar
efforts (Radosevic 2002a: 355; Radosevic & Reid 2006: 297; also INNO-
Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007 for comprehensive
overviews of CEE countries’ policies and challenges). In contents, an over-
whelming number of policy measures concentrate upon innovation pro-
grammes and technology platforms (Reid and Peter 2008). At the same
time, the CEE emerging innovation policies are characterized by their hori-
zontal nature: policy measures typically do not specify sectors but are
rather open to all sectors. (See Figure 11) Arguably, this has to do with they
way CEE policy makers understood EU state aid regulations (Reid and Peter
2008). We argue that this has to do with both a general neo-liberal outlook
(i.e. let the Ricardian comparative advantage work through markets rather
than to rely on government interventions through priorities etc) carried by
most CEE policy makers by the early 2000s and also their particular skills
that concentrated into macro-economic areas. (See also Drahokoupil 2007) 
25
19 An excellent discussion of the paradox is Dosi, Llerena and Labini 2005.Figure 11. Innovation policy measures in CEE, sector-specific measures vs horizontal
measures.
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Source: Based on Reid and Peter 2008.
Figure 11 also shows that compared to their EU neighbors CEE countries
have typically significantly more innovation policy measures (especially if
deflated by the size of respective econonomies). This can be interpreted as
a growing fragmentation of the policy arena between multitudes of meas-
ures and implementation agencies.
In addition, as a majority of CEE measures are financed through EU struc-
tural funds, these instruments are mostly competition and project based.
Interestingly, CEE countries exhibit significantly more innovation policy
measures than the ‘old’ member states that. These aspects – project based
implementation, multitude of horizontal measures – point to high fragmen-
tation of the entire innovation policy field as well as to lack of policy prior-
ities or the ability to set the latter. It is also evidence of the strongly mar-
ket-driven understanding of innovation that is at odds with the underlying
assumption that innovation policies need to alleviate the ‘European para-
dox’. That is, a typical CEE innovation policy measure aims to commercial-
ize a certain R&D result, typically in a high-tech area, but the result and thus
the initiative have to come from the market. This, however, has scarcely
any justifications in reality: first, CEE R&D systems and their performance
26
20 Sector-specific are policy instruments that deal with one sector (e.g. biotechnology) only; hori-
zontal measures are allocated to multiple sectors or do not specify any sector at all. See for details
Reid and Peter 2008.disintegrated heavily during the 1990s and fell noticeably behind East Asia;
second, this was complemented by the strong specialization into the low-
end of various value-chains,  meaning that the demand for R&D and skills
remains relatively low.
However, particularly since mid 2006 and 2007 there is a noticeable
change towards including existing (low/mid-technology and outsourcing)
industries into innovation policy making. In some countries, for instance
Estonia, EU accession triggered a very significant policy change which
brought innovation policy onto the agenda very strongly; in others, for
instance in Slovenia and Hungary, the changes in policy focus occurred ear-
lier and were more vocal. However, the changes were and are often accom-
panied by relatively little increase in actual funding and, as importantly, by
relatively little public attention and discussion of policy strategy. (Tiits et al
2008; also INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007) 
The impact of the European Commission (EC) in creation of these policies
and in influencing their content has been enormous. One of the best ways
to follow how the EC negotiated with the accession countries, and influ-
enced innovation policy after the accession, is to follow the so-called nego-
tiating mandates (essentially communications and feedback from the EC
about the accession countries’ plans how and for what to use the EU’s
structural funding). These documents are not public, thus we will quote
here from various negotiating mandates in a way that countries will remain
anonymous. All quotes pertain to 2004-2006 documents.
Example 1:
the Commission distinguishes three core areas of intervention [that are
needed]: 
business infrastructure, improvement of institutional structure for 
business development and improvement of facilities for technolo-
gy transfer and co-operation mechanisms between research 
departments and industry in order to boost the innovation capaci-
ty of the private sector and to increase the added value and labour
productivity;
active labour market policies in order to reduce the gap between 
(qualitative) demand and supply on the labour market and to 
upgrade the training infrastructure in order to adapt to demands on 
the labour market in a flexible way;







The description of the priorities is insufficiently selective. 
Formulation of objectives, priorities covers a very wide “sector of
interests” and do not define priority (preferential) needs and solu-
tions.
...
Therefore the EC recommends the **** authorities to seek for
further reduction of priorities and prioritization of actions.
Example 3
The current structure of Priorities does not seem to reflect the real 
needs of the business sector. There is e.g. very little said on the 
development of research environment, facilities, and infrastructure 
and there are only a few references to investment in research 
infrastructure. No clear measure is foreseen on how to establish 
links between R&D and Industry, though the importance of this 
type of relationship is stressed. 
Example 4
In this regard, the NDP is effectively silent on the country’s use of
Foreign Direct Investment as an element of its industrial policy and
makes no reference to industrial specialization and emergence of 
clusters where ***** may have a competitive advantage.
Example 5
One of the most prominent features in the structure of the ****
economy is the wide disparity that exists in sub-regional develop-
ment.  … The NDP does not analyse this as a separate entity, and
this is needed.
Example 6
As well as a national strategy for catching up, a comprehensive 
approach is needed to provide more favourable conditions for 
employment creation, by, for example, improving the functioning 
of the labour, product, and housing markets, especially in areas of
high unemployment.29
These examples stem from different negotiating mandates and different
countries, but it is noticeable that most of them are distinctly similar in the
following aspects: 
1)The EC goes to great lengths to emphasize the need to manage
both creation of new knowledge (through FDI and knowledge
transfer as well as through domestic industry and R&D) but also 
the alleviation of  obvious negative effects of the rapid restructu-
ring that took place in the 1990s (addressing regional strong 
imbalances, need for active labour market policies etc).
2)One of the biggest problems in EC mandates seems to be low
administrative capacity in the then accessing countries (from ana-
lytical capabilities to financial management problems); in particular 
long-term strategic management issues are emphasized. Indeed, 
this is perhaps the key problem in the emerging CEE innovation 
policy framework. (See more below)
3)Next to providing funding for various activities that should
enhance upgrading, the EC stresses the need for ‘function mar-
kets’ in various areas. This development is paralleled in the way
the Lisbon strategy was transformed around 2005 from a clearly
Schumpeterian innovation-oriented strategic framework into very 
wide strategic guidelines that seek to deepen EU’s common mar-
ket and see in the latter (that is, in the increased competition) main 
driver for innovation and growth. (See Reinert and Kattel 2007)
It is also evident that at least among some experts in the European
Commission there were growing doubts over the entire nature of CEE inte-
gration. That is, while the overall assumption of symmetrical integration still
holds, there are obviously some areas where CEE countries have suffered
during the integration process and accordingly need specific measures to
remedy this.
In terms of implementation, the trend initiated during the harmonization peri-
od through creation of financial and management agencies has been intensi-
fied with the structural funds. (See INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports
2006 and 2007 for an overview) It is fair to say that the problems with these
agencies that started during the harmonization period are partially deepened
since 2004. Indeed, it can be argued that most problems summarized above
in CEE innovation policies in one way or other go back to the institutional
framework of agencies. Almost all CEE innovation policy implementation
problems go back to very weak and disorganised actors, coordination prob-
lems are rampant in policy design and implementation (see also Radosevic
2002a: 355). On the one hand, there is a clear separation of policy respon-
sibility between education/science and innovation/industry on the ministerial
level and its delivery system (Nauwelaers & Reid 2002: 365; also see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007). On the other hand, this
kind of fragmented policy-making system has in its turn resulted in the lack
of inter-linking and cooperation between different innovation-related activi-
ties and actors such as research organisations, government and industry (see
INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007). 
While the creation and role of innovation policy agencies is praised in very
positive terms by the official European Innovation Progress Report (2006:
65), we argue that precisely this agentification is at the root of many CEE
innovation policy problems. 
The main driver behind the engagement of agencies in policy-making is
believed to be in the specific knowledge and expertise carried by these
agencies (so-called “best of breed” providers) (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004:
29), but also the agencies’ ability to be more in touch with certain specific
circumstances and environment, and hence also with the needs of clients
(“increased reach”) (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004: 28, 34). Due to its empha-
sis on efficiency, this kind of innovation policy implementation model favors
outsourcing of programme management and is generally highly market
friendly as signals from the market are believed to be best policy guide (see
European Innovation Progress Report 2006: 65-66). However, many CEE
countries have seen their economies massively restructured during the
1990s that resulted, as we saw above, in an economic structure oriented
towards outsourcing and low value added activities or sectors where net-
working and linkages are naturally very low. Indeed, under the circum-
stances where the ICT-led paradigm is enforcing de-agglomeration effects
upon such economic structures and where macro-economic competencies
in policy making have been a priority throughout the previous decade, most
CEE countries have almost no experience in creating long-term policy frame-
works that deal with networking, sectoral upgrading and so on. Thus, it is
clear why the EC went to such great lengths to influence what the CEE
countries are doing with the EU structural funding. It is, however, also clear
that to create implementation agencies into such a situation is bound to
complicate the problems. Indeed, agentification in these kinds of circum-
stances does not foster networking practices, but rather may cause severe
problems in policy design and implementation as agencies are by definition
at arm’s length to government offices. Such tendencies tend to cause insta-
bility in a system as a side effect (see here case studies about the old mem-
ber states by Pollitt et al. 2004). That is why the issue of agentification and
particularly in innovation policy has been heavily raised by OECD in one of
its latest reports (2005). Besides fragmented policy coordination together
with goal congruence, contorted oversight, communication meltdown,
capacity shortages and relation instability (for the most fundamental
overview in these issues, see OECD 2005; but also Goldsmith & Eggers
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2004), the delegation of public authority may be seen as a way to shift the
responsibility away from government, and hence cause severe accountabil-
ity problems. Indeed, as the EC’s impact on CEE innovation policy making,
while probably the key force in shaping these policies, is largely unofficial
(the negotiating mandates we quoted from are not public, nor are they dis-
cussed in the respective parliaments), the accountability problem may
become more and more important. 
Thus, to sum up, while with the introduction of structural funds and
through strong influence from the European Commission, CEE innovation
policies are significantly changing since the mid-2000s, there are also seri-
ous problems that emerged with this trend. First, as we argued, the emerg-
ing innovation policies tend to be based on rather linear understanding of
innovation (from lab to market) whereas most CEE countries are specialized
into low end production activities virtually void of any research and with
low demand for high skills; in addition, the R&D system as such has been
under constant pressure since the transition and its performance has been
clearly lacking. Thus, CEE innovation policies tend to solve problems not
existing in the respective economies. Second, through creation of innova-
tion policy implementation agencies (for structural funding and beyond), the
innovation policy landscape is fragmented and previous problems in policy
creation (lack of strategic skills and capacity, networking and coordination
non-existent) and implementation (competitive grant-based programming
that relies on market signals without being able to follow set priorities and
goals) are only deepened. One can argue that the innovation policies emerg-
ing in the process of Europeanization are based on the assumption that pol-
icy design and implementation follow a public-private partnership model, yet
in reality CEE countries singularly lack the ability to implement such a
model, and what is more, actual developments in industry seem to suggest
that such a model is particularly ill-fitted to the CEE context.
In addition, there is an essential problem that CEE economic and innovation
policy making ignored throughout the 1990s and 2000s in devising policies
to deliver economic restructuring and growth. A stable macro-economic
environment envisioned to enable FDI inflow – in which CEE were indeed
spectacularly successful – also encouraged massive private foreign lending
(mostly through foreign banks settling into CEE markets that borrowed in
foreign currency). This drove in particular since the mid 2000s consump-
tion and real-estate booms in all CEE countries (see e.g. Fitch 2007a,
2007b and 2007c; see also Krugman 2008b in this context). Indeed, most
CEE countries are highly dependent on foreign investments and private bor-
rowing and thus they were caught in a macroeconomic dead end with
appreciating exchange rates, negative current account balances and grow-
ing private indebtedness. This led to increased financial fragility throughdeteriorating balance of payments account and left CEE countries starving
for new foreign lending and investments that however stopped in the
aftermath of the global financial meltdown in 2008. In essence, CEE indus-
trial restructuring and innovation model became a giant Ponzi scheme. As
global, especially inner-EU demand slows, so do CEE exports and by early
2009 most CEE currencies have seen massive drops in their value and for-
eign investors seem to flee en masse (see also Fitch 2009). At the same
time, in particular Central European countries such as Slovakia, Hungary
and the Czech Republic have achieved high levels of integration with the
EU: merchandising exports in worth of up to 60% of GDP goes in these
countries to the EU (IMF DOTS database). Debt deflation looks very likely.
Fragmented innovation policy seen, inherited from the accession into the
EU, paralyses CEE countries’ policy inaction as there seems to be no seri-
ous policy evaluation capacity present and coordination problems prevent
quick reaction to a radically changed environment.
Conclusion
It is important to note how two key variables have shaped what kind of
companies thrive in CEE: the new techno-economic paradigm (including a
new ‘common sense’ as to the creation, organization, and management of
knowledge in companies) and the global macroeconomic environment cre-
ated by the Washington Consensus policies. These two variables also shape
what kind of innovations take place in many CEE companies and have had
a huge impact on local education, R&D, and S&T. Thus, the neo-liberal poli-
cies of the 1990s were a double-edged sword delivering a very fast indus-
trial restructuring, but also leaving CEE economies with a primitivized eco-
nomic structure, locked into low value added activities with a low score on
the dynamic Quality Index of economic activities. Drawing on the parallel
between ‘old’ EU vs. CEE in Europe and US vs. Mexico in NAFTA, the CEE
a sense provided a low-skilled/low increasing returns maquila sector to ‘old’
EU just as Mexico did to the US. In both cases – in the CEE and in Mexico
– the loss of the traditional diversified and potentially highly linkaged indus-
trial sector provided incentives for outward migration. This migration was
directed toward the areas with an industrial sector exhibiting higher quality
activities from a dynamic Schumpeterian point of view. In both cases the
surge of China made it very difficult – both for NAFTA and the EU – to cre-
ate a win-win flying geese pattern of sequential industrial upgrading with its
industrial periphery.   
The influence of the European Union, first through accession talks in the
form of a harmonization of legal infrastructure and creation of first innova-
tion policy implementation agencies and later massively through structural
funds, is equally a blessing in disguise. It has brought, on the one hand, cre-
32ation of the first long-term innovation policies in CEE, which are, on the
other hand, poorly tailored to local circumstances and implemented in a way
that only made the situation worse. 
Table 1 summarizes the main developments in CEE innovation policies since
1990. 
Table 1. Changes in innovation policy models.
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The Washington Consensus policies, helped by the techno-economic para-
digm changes, pushed the CEE economies unto a very different track of eco-
nomic integration (an asymmetrical and integrative one) than initially envi-
sioned by the overwhelming majority in the developing community and CEE
policy makers: Ricardian comparative advantage was supposed to help
restructure CEE economies and lead to symmetrical and integrative integra-
tion. In fact, we would argue that the greatest benefits from trade are a result
of a large division of labour in activities with a large potential for innovation
and subject to increasing returns (Reinert 2007). In this perspective, both CEE
and Mexico specialized in the ‘wrong’ comparative advantage, locking them
into technological dead-ends. In such a setting successful R&D projects are
very difficult to match with the existing productive sectors: poor peripheral
countries are in fact likely to subsidize R&D that materialize as innovations and
increased added value in the core ‘old’ industrial countries.  The EU accession initially only deepened the path dependencies of special-
ization into the lower end of value chains through the harmonization
process. The accession proper, following in 2004, brought policy advice
from the European Commission that often assumed that the industrial
restructuring had been mostly successful and that CEE is by now a smaller
version of the ‘old’ EU. This, however, is largely misleading and also the
European Commission shows signs of recognizing this misconception about
CEE development and it pressurizes CEE countries to adopt a much more
active role of the state in economic restructuring and innovation policies, in
particular through structural funding.
Thus, we can summarize CEE industrial restructuring as evolution in orga-
nizational capabilities and national system of innovations into two rough
periods, the 1990s and the 2000s (the period of harmonizations from
1998-2004 can be seen here as a transitional period that carries over many
features into the next period and yet also paves way for the new period).
Table 2 summarizes this evolution.
Table 2. Evolution of organizational capabilities and national innovation systems in CEE




Main features of organizational 
capabilities
- Productivity increases through
slashing liabilities and 
employment;
- Replacement of products and
machinery;
- Foreign ownership provides key
access to management and 
marketing know-how and 
production networks;
- Modularity in production
enhanced by ICT paradigm and 
harmonization with the EU 
regulations
- Contract work for European 
companies;
- Process innovations prevail
through cost-cutting initiatives, 
new machinery;
- Marketing and brand creation for
home markets in certain industries
(media, food);
- Speculative real-estate activities
Main features of national 
innovation system
- Privatization programs and other 
measures to attract FDI;
- Emphasis on macro-economic stability;
- Erosion and partial disintegration of
the previous R&D system;
- Harmonization of legal environment
with EU requirements;
- Prevalence of macro-economic 
policy skills;
- Policy initiatives assume symmetrical
integration of CEE into global economy
- Increasing fragmentation of policy
arena through agencies that results in
strong coordination problems;
- Growing mismatch between R&D 
system, high-tech biased innovation 
policy and actual industry needs;
- Increasing foreign lending and 
consumption booms that result in 
financial fragilityWe showed that integration into the EU has brought a clear change into the
innovation policy environment. Since joining the EU in 2004 or 2007
respectively, and already during the accession talks, there is a strong but
almost not publicly discussed change in innovation policies in many CEE
countries towards a much more active role of the state. In this change there
is a clear and strong role of EU’s structural funding, particularly negotiations
and planning that come with it. However, these changes come with spe-
cific problems: first, there is an over-emphasis in emerging CEE innovation
policies on linear innovation (from lab to market) that is based on the
assumption that there is a growing demand from industry for R&D (which
is not the case, because of the structural changes that took place in the
1990s), and, second, increasing usage of independent agencies in an
already weak administrative capacity environment lacking policy skills for
networking and long-term planning. We argued that such Europeanization
of innovation policy in CEE, while highly positive in directing CEE to reori-
ent economic policies towards more sustainable growth, is in its imple-
mentation often only deepening and exasperating the existing problems of
networking, clustering and coordination.
Both key phases in industrial restructuring of CEE industry and evolution in
respective policies, Washington Consensus and Europeanization respective-
ly, created in enforcing each other’s negative impacts (specialization into
low-end production and policy fragmentation and weak administrative
capacity) heavy financial fragility for CEE countries on the brink of global
financial crisis in 2008. As the crisis unfolds in 2009, it becomes clear that
CEE economies are particularly vulnerable to global recessions and the rea-
sons lie with the development model chosen by these countries since the
1990s. ‘The chickens are coming home to roost’: past mistakes are return-
ing with a vengeance. The key task CEE countries face now – apart from
surviving the gathering tsunami in and around these countries – is to bring
about a new indigenous form of capitalism with significantly less financial
fragility and much more sustainable organizational capabilities and much
changed national innovation systems.
35References
Akamatsu, Kaname (1961). A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World
Economy, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 86, 196-217.
Bailey, David and Lisa de Propris (2004). “A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-
Accession Aid and Capacity-Building in the Candidate Countries”,
Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (1), 77-89.
Becker, Joachim and Rudy Weissenbacher, eds. (2007). Dollarization, 
Euroization and Financial Instability. Central and Eastern European
Countries between Stagnation and Financial Crisis? Marburg:
Metropolis.
Berger, Suzanne (2006). How We Compete. What Companies Around the
World Are Doing to Make It in Today’s Global Economy, New York
etc: Currency Doubleday. 
Bergson, Abram (1978). Productivity and the Social System – The USSR
and the West. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Berliner, Joseph S. (1976). The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Botero, Giovanni (1590). ‘Delle cause della grandezza delle città’, in his
Della Ragione di Stato. Libri Dieci. Rome: Vicenzio Pellagalo. English
translation 1706. 
Bruszt, Laazlo (2002). “Making Markets and Eastern Enlargement:
Diverging Convergence”. West European Politics, 25 (2), 121-140.
Bruszt, Laszlo and Gerald A. McDermott (2008). “Transnational Integration
Regimes as Development Programs”. Available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1313324. 
Business Week (2007). “Balda: The iPhone’s German Accent”, April 5, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/
apr2007/gb20070405_436341.htm. 
Chandler, Alfred (1993). “Organisation capabilities and industrial restruc-
turing: a historical analysis”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 17
(2), 309-337.
Chandler, Alfred (2005). Inventing the Electronic Century. The Epic Story
of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Cimoli, Mario ed. (2000). Developing Innovation Systems. Mexico in a
Global Context, London: Continuum.
Cimoli, Mario, João Carlos Ferraz and Annalisa Primi (2005). Science and
technology policies in open economies: The case of Latin America
and the Caribbean. Santiago: ECLAC, available at www.cepal.org. 
Drahokoupil, Jan (2007). “From National Capitalisms to Foreign-Led 
Growth: The Moment of Convergence in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, in Becker and Weissenbacher, eds. (2007), 87-108.
Dosi, Giovanni, Patrick Llerena and Mauro Sylos Labini (2005). “Science
36Technology-Industry Links and the ‘European Paradox’: Some Notes
on the Dynamics of Scientific and Technological Research in
Europe”, LEM Working Paper Series 2005/2, available at http://
www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2005-02.pdf. 
Drechsler, Wolfgang (2004). “Governance, Good Governance, and 
Government: the Case for Estonian Administrative Capacity”, 
TRAMES, 8 (58/53), 4, 388-396.
European Innovation Scoreboard (2006). Available from: http://www.proin-
no-europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_?nal.pdf. 
Fitch (2007a). Risks rising in the Baltic States? Special report, 6 March. 
Fitch (2007b). Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania – how sustainable are external
imbalances? Special report, 20 March. 
Fitch (2007c). The Baltic States: risks rising in the trailblazers of emerging 
Europe? Special report, 8 June.
Fitch (2009). Emerging Europe: Negative Outlook!, January 2009.
Freeman, Chris (1974). The Economics of Industrial Innovation. London:
Routledge.
Freeman, Chris (1987). Technology Policy and Economic Performance:
Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter.
Frost, Ann and Marc Weinstein (1998). “ABB Poland”, Richard Ivey School
of Business. The University of Ontario.
Goetz, Klaus H. (2001). “Making Sense of Post-Communist Central 
Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?” 
Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 1032-1051.
Goldsmith, Stephen and William D. Eggers (2004). Governing by Network. 
The New Shape of the Public Sector, Washington, D.C: Brookings
Institution Press. 
Grabbe, Heather. (2006). The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization
through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Guerrieri, Paolo (1998). “Trade Patterns, FDI, and Industrial Restructuring
of Central and Eastern Europe”, BRIE Working Paper Series, no 124, 
available at http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/WP124.pdf.
Havlik, Peter (2005). “Central and East European Industry in an Enlarged
European Union: Restructuring, Specialisation And Catching-Up”,
Économie internationale, 102, 107-132.
Havlik, Peter, Michael Landesmann, Robert Stehrer, Roman Römisch, and 
B. Gilsätter (2001). Competitiveness of industry in CEE candidate
countries: composite paper. Vienna: Vienna Institute for Internatio-
nal Economic Studies. 
Hotopp, Ulrike, Slavo Radosevic and Kate Bishop (2005). “Trade and
Industrial Upgrading in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe:
Patterns of Scale- and Scope-Based Learning”, Emerging Markets
Finance and Trade, 41(4), 20-37.
37INNO-Policy TrendChart (2006 and 2007). INNO-Policy TrendChart Annual
Country Reports for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Rumenia. 
Reports for the years of 2006 and 2007, in some occasions (to
specify facts) reports for earlier years have been used. 
Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturplanung, Germany (2005) 
ESPON 2.2.2 Pre-Accession Aid Impact Analysis. Final Report.
Available at: http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/ 
projects/243/340/file_653/fr-2.2.2-full.pdf. 
Jacobs, Jane (1984). Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Econo-
mic Life, New York: Random House.
King, Charles (1721). The British Merchant or Commerce Preserv’d, 
London.
Kosta, Jiri (2005). Die tschechische/tschechoslowakische Wirtschaft im 
mehrfachen Wandel, Münster: LIT Verlag.
Kregel, Jan A. (2008). “The Discrete Charm of the Washington
Consensus.” The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working
Paper No 533. Available at http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_533.pdf. 
Krugman, Paul (1996). “Ricardo’s difficult idea”. Available at http://web. 
mit.edu/krugman/www/ricardo.htm 
Krugman, Paul (2008a). “Trade and Wage, Reconsidered”, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/pk-bpea-draft.pdf.
Krugman, Paul (2008b). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis 
of 2008. London: Penguin.
Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obstfeld (2005). International Economics.
Theory and Policy, 7
th ed. Boston etc: Pearson Addison Wesley.
Landesmann, Michael (2000). Structural Change in the Transition
Economies, 1989 to 1999. WIIW Research Report No. 269, avai-
lable at http://www.wiiw.ac.at/pdf/RR269Summ.pdf.
Margolius, Ivan and Charles Meisl (1992). Skoda, London: Osprey.
Martens, Bertin (2000). “The performance of the EC Phare programme as
an instrument for institutional reform in the EU candidate member
states”. Paper prepared for the 4
th IMAD conference on Institutions
in Transition, Portoroz (Slovenia), 23-24 June, 2000.
Martens, Bertin (2001). “The Performance of the EC Phare Programme as 
an Instrument for Institutional Reform in the EU Candidate Member-
States”,  Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development & 
Transition, 5, 35-47.
Mencinger, Jo￿e (2007). “From Socialism to EU Membership”, in Becker 
and Weissenbacher, eds.( 2007) 19-34.
Meske, Werner (1998). Institutional Transformation of S&T Systems in the
European Economies in Transition. Comparative Analysis. Available
at http://bibliothek.wz-berlin.de/pdf/1998/p98-403.pdf. 
Nauwelaers, Claire & Alastair Reid (2002). “Learning Innovation Policy in a
38Market-based Context: Process, Issues and Challenges for EU 
Candidate-countries”,  Journal of International Relations and
Development, 5 (4), 357-379.
Nelson, Richard and Sidney Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
OECD (2005). Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 1, Synthesis
Report, OECD.
OECD and Eurostat (2005). Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Innovation Data, Oslo Manual, 3
rd edition, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Paine, Robert (1977). The White Arctic: Anthropological Essays on
Tutelage and Ethnicity. St. John’s: Institute of Social and Economic
Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada.
Palma, Jose Gabriel (2005). “The seven main ‘stylized facts’ of the
Mexican economy since trade liberalization and NAFTA,” Industrial
and Corporate Change, 14 (6), 941-991.
Perez, Carlota (2002). Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The
Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Perez, Carlota (2006). “Respecialisation and the deployment of the ICT par-
adigm: An essay on the present challenges of globalization”, in
Compañó et al. (eds.), The Future of the Information Society in
Europe: Contributions to the debate, Seville, Spain, European
Commission, Directorate General Joint Research Centre.  
Pollitt, Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield and Amanda Smullen
(2004).  Agencies: How Governments do Things through Semi-
Autonomous Organizations, Basington: Palgrave Macmillan.
Porter, Michael E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New
York: Free Press.
Radosevic, Slavo (1998). “The Transformation of National Systems of
Innovation in Eastern Europe: Between Restructuring and Erosion” 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 7(1), 77-108.
Radosevic, Slavo (1999). “Transformation of science and technology sys-
tems into systems of innovation in central and eastern Europe: the
emerging patterns and determinants” Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, 10(3-4), 277-320.
Radosevic, S. (2002a). “Introduction: Building the Basis for Future Growth
– Innovation Policy as a Solution”, Journal of International Relations
and Development, 5 (4), 352-356.
Radosevic, Slavo (2002b). “Regional Innovation Systems in Central and
Eastern Europe: Determinants, Organizers and Alignments”, Journal
of Technology Transfer, 27 (1), 87-96.
Radosevic, Slavo (2004). “A Two-Tier or Multi-Tier Europe? Assessing the
Innovation Capacities of Central and East European Countries in the
Enlarged EU”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(3), 641-666.
Radosevic, Slavo (2006). “The Knowledge-based Economy in Central and 
39Eastern Europe: An Overview of Key Issues”, in K. Piech and S.
Radosevic (eds). The Knowledge-based Economy in Central and
Eastern Europe: Countries and Industries in a Process of Change,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 31-53.
Radosevic, Slavo and Deniz Eylem Yoruk (2001). Videoton: The growth of
enterprise through entrepreneurship and network alignment,
University College London, Center for the Study of Economic and
Social Change in Europe, Working Paper No. 3.
Radosevic, Slavo and Alastair Reid (2006). “Innovation Policy for a
Knowledge-based Economy in Central and Eastern Europe: Driver of 
Growth or New Layer of Bureaucracy?” In K. Piech and S. 
Radosevic (eds.), Knowledge-Based Economy in Central and East 
European Countries: Countries and Industries in a Process of
Change, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 295-311.
Reid, Alastair and Viola Peter (2008). Sectoral Innovation Systems: The
Policy Landscape in the EU25, available at www.europe-innova.org. 
Reinert, Erik S. (1980). International Trade and the Economic Mechanisms 
of Underdevelopment, Cornell University PhD thesis.
Reinert, Erik S. (2006). “European Integration, Innovations and Uneven 
Economic Growth: Challenges and Problems of EU 2005”, in
Compañó, R. et al. (eds.), The Future of the Information Society in 
Europe: Contributions to the debate, Seville, Spain: European 
Commission, Directorate General Joint Research Centre. Institute
for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), 124-152.
Reinert, Erik S. (2007). How Rich Countries Got Rich . . . and Why Poor 
Countries Stay Poor, London: Constable.
Reinert, Erik S., Yves Ekoué Amaïzo and Rainer Kattel (2009). “The
Economics of Failed, Failing and Fragile States: Productive Structure
as the Missing Link”, The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn 
University of Technology Working Papers in Technology 
Governance and Economic Dynamics, forthcoming.
Reinert, Erik S. and Rainer Kattel (2007). “European Eastern Enlargement as
Europe’s Attempted Economic Suicide?” The Other Canon and
Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology
Governance and Economic Dynamics, no 14, available at www. 
technologygovernance.eu.
Rodrik, Dani (1992). “Making sense of the Soviet trade shock in Eastern
Europe: A Framework and some estimates”, NBER Working Paper,
no 4112.
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004). “Governance by
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11
(4), 669-687.
Serra, Antonio (1613). Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbon-
40dare li regni d’oro & argento dove non sono miniere, Naples.
Serra, Antonio (2009). A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of
Nations (1613), edited and with an introduction by Sophus A. 
Reinert, London: Anthem, forthcoming.
Stokes, Raymond G. (2000). Constructing Socialism. Technology and
Change in East Germany 1945-1990, Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Tiits, Marek, Rainer Kattel, Tarmo Kalvet and Dorel Tamm (2008).
“Catching up, forging ahead or falling behind? Central and Eastern 
European development in 1990-2005”, Innovation. The European
Journal of Social Science Research, 21 (1), 65-85. 
Weissenbacher, Rudy (2007). “Historical Considerations of Uneven
Development in East Central Europe”, in Becker and Weissenbacher,
eds.(2007). 35-83.
Vernon, Raymond (1966). “International Investment and International Trade 
in the Product Cycle”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 190-
207.
Wolf, Martin (2007). “The growth of nations”, Financial Times, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da491b56-34fd-11dc-bb160000
779fd2ac.html.  
Young, Aleegra (1994). “Gerber Products Company: Investing in the New
Poland”, Harvard Business School case study.
4142 42
Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 
The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, and the Technology Governance
program at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Estonia, have launched
a new working papers series, entitled “Working Papers in Technology
Governance and Economic Dynamics”. In the context denoted by the title
series, it will publish original research papers, both practical and theoretical,
both narrative and analytical, in the area denoted by such concepts as
uneven economic growth, techno-economic paradigms, the history and the-
ory of economic policy, innovation strategies, and the public management
of innovation, but also generally in the wider fields of industrial policy,
development, technology, institutions, finance, public policy, and econom-
ic and financial history and theory.
The idea is to offer a venue for quickly presenting interesting papers –
scholarly articles, especially as preprints, lectures, essays in a form that
may be developed further later on – in a high-quality, nicely formatted ver-
sion, free of charge: all working papers are downloadable for free from
http://hum.ttu.ee/tg as soon as they appear, and you may also order a free
subscription by e-mail attachment directly from the same website.









Erik S. Reinert, Evolutionary Economics, Classical Development
Economics, and the History of Economic Policy: A Plea for
Theorizing by Inclusion.
Richard R. Nelson, Economic Development from the Perspective
of Evolutionary Economic Theory.
Erik S. Reinert, Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and
Development to Prevent ‘Welfare Colonialism’.
Jan Kregel and Leonardo Burlamaqui, Finance, Competition,
Instability, and Development Microfoundations and Financial
Scaffolding of the Economy.
Erik S. Reinert, European Integration, Innovations and Uneven
Economic Growth: Challenges and Problems of EU 2005.
Leonardo Burlamaqui, How Should Competition Policies and
Intellectual Property Issues Interact in a Globalised World?
A Schumpeterian Perspective
Paolo Crestanello and Giuseppe Tattara, Connections and
Competences in the Governance of the Value Chain. How
Industrial Countries Keep their Competitive Power43
Sophus A. Reinert, Darwin and the Body Politic: Schäffle, Veblen,
and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics
Antonio Serra, Breve Trattato / A Short Treatise (1613) (available
only in hardcopy and by request).
Joseph L. Love, The Latin American Contribution to Center-
Periphery Perspectives: History and Prospect
Ronald Dore, Shareholder capitalism comes to Japan
Per Högselius, Learning to Destroy. Case studies of creative
destruction management in the new Europe
Gabriel Yoguel, Analía Erbes, Verónica Robert, and José Borello,
Diffusion and appropriation of knowledge in different organiza-
tional structures
Erik S. Reinert and Rainer Kattel, European Eastern Enlargement
as Europe’s Attempted Economic Suicide?
Carlota Perez, Great Surges of development and alternative forms
of globalization
Erik S. Reinert, Iulie Aslaksen, Inger Marie G. Eira, Svein
Mathiesen, Hugo Reinert &  Ellen Inga Turi, Adapting to Climate
Change in Reindeer Herding: The Nation-State as Problem and
Solution
Lawrence King, Patrick Hamm, The Governance Grenade: Mass
Privatization, State Capacity and Economic Development in
Postcommunist and Reforming Communist Societies
Reinert, Erik S., Yves Ekoué Amaïzo and Rainer Kattel. The
Economics of Failed, Failing and Fragile States: Productive
Structure as the Missing Link
Carlota Perez, The New Technologies: An Integrated View
Carlota Perez, Technological revolutions and techno-economic
paradigms
Rainer Kattel, Jan A. Kregel, Erik S. Reinert, The Relevance of
Ragnar Nurkse and Classical Development Economics
Erik S. Reinert, Financial Crises, Persistent Poverty, and the
Terrible Simplifiers in Economics: A Turning Point Towards a New
“1848 Moment”
Rainer Kattel, Erik S. Reinert and Margit Suurna, Industrial
Restructuring and Innovation Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
since 1990
The working paper series is edited by Rainer Kattel (kattel@staff.ttu.ee), 
Wolfgang Drechsler (drechsler@staff.ttu.ee), and Erik S. Reinert (reinert@staff.ttu.ee),
who all of them will be happy to receive submissions, suggestions or referrals.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.  
23.